篇一：关于核安全知识
核安全知识
问：“核安全”的定义是什么？核安全事件如何划分等级？
答：广义的核安全是指涉及核材料及放射性核素相关的安全问题，目前包括放射性物质管理、前端核资源开采利用设施安全、核电站安全运行、乏燃料后处理设施安全及全过程的防核扩散等议题。
狭义的核安全是指在核设施的设计、建造、运行和退役期间，为保护人员、社会和环境免受可能的放射性危害的所采取的技术和组织上的措施的综合。该措施包括：确保核设施的正常运行，预防事故的发生，限制可能的事故后果。那么核安全相关事件是如何分级？
历史上，1986年的苏联切尔诺贝利核事故即被定义为最严重的7级（切尔诺贝利核事故记录视频可选择去优酷网搜索）。当时，核电站4号反应堆发生爆炸，导致8吨放射性物质泄露，直接污染核电站周围6万多平方公里，320多万人受到辐射；1979年美国三里岛核事故则属于5级。当时，由于核电站机组的制冷系统出现故障，导致大量放射性物质泄露，至少15万居民被迫撤离。
问：在发生核与辐射突发事件后，不同阶段可采取怎样的防护措施？ 答：事件发生1至2天内，对人员可以采用的防护措施有：隐蔽、呼吸道防护、服用稳定性碘、撤离、控制进出口通路等。其中呼吸道防护是用干或湿毛巾捂住鼻子的行动，可防止或减少吸入放射性核素。服用稳定性碘能防止或减少烟羽中放射性碘进入体内后在甲状腺内沉积。
在事件中期阶段，已有相当大量的放射性物质沉积于地面。此时，对个人而言除了可考虑终止呼吸道防护外，其他的早期防护措施可继续采用。为避免长时间停留而受到过高的累积剂量，主管部门可采取有控制和有计划地将人群由污染区向外搬迁。还应该考虑限制当地生产或储存的视频和饮用水的销售和消费。根据这个时期对人员照射途径的特点，可采取的防护措施还有：在畜牧业中使用储存饲料，对人员体表去污，对伤病员救治等。
在事故晚期（恢复期）面临的问题是：是否和何时可以恢复社会正常生活；或者是否需要进一步采取防护措施。在事件晚期，主要照射途径为污染食品的食入和再悬浮物质的吸入引起的内照射。因此，可采取的防护
措施包括控制进出口通路、避迁、控制食品和水，使用储存饲料和地区污染等。
问：核辐射扩散范围有多广？
答：核辐射扩散会随着空间范围的扩大而逐渐稀释，一定距离（一般不超过100公里）后核辐射的剂量几乎就降到天然本地水平。另外，核辐射也可能在固体或流体中迁移，但我国与日本隔海，海水也能大量稀释核辐射，当然在核电站辐射源附近，海岸环境还是有不同程度的影响。
问：身边的辐射剂量知多少？
答：据中国疾病控制中心介绍，少两的辐射照射不会危及人类的健康，过量的放射性射线照射对人体会产生伤害，使人疾病、致死。剂量越大，危害越大。
数据显示，人类每时每刻都生活在各种辐射中。来自天然辐射的个人年有效剂量全球平均约为2.4毫西弗，其中，来自宇宙射线约为0.4毫西弗，来自地面γ射线的约为0.5毫西弗，吸入（主要是室内氡）产生的为
1.2毫西弗，食入为0.3毫西弗。
人们每年摄入的空气、食物、水中的辐射照射剂量约为0.25毫西弗。戴夜光表每年有0.02毫西弗；乘飞机履行2000公里约0.01毫西弗；每天抽20支烟，一年有0.5到1毫西弗；一次X光检查有0.1毫西弗。
数据显示，当辐射剂量低于100毫西弗时，医学上观察不到对人体的确定性效应，即明显的组织损伤；当剂量超过4000毫西弗，在没有医学监护的情况下，有50%的死亡率，而当剂量超过6000毫西弗时，则可能致命。
问：吃什么东西对抗辐射效果好？
答：对抗辐射最好的物质就是多糖，特别是食用菌多糖，日常饮食中可以适当食用木耳、银耳、香菇、杏鲍菇等。食用菌多糖可有效吸附有害放射物，促进毒物排泄。炒食、炖食均可。此外，还可食用海参，它富含多糖和胶原蛋白，是很好的抗辐射食品。我们还可以食用提高免疫力的食物，如高蛋白食物、富含胡萝卜素的食物，特别要多吃红色、黄绿色果蔬。菠菜、白菜等绿叶菜大多都可以食用。动物肉皮、骨髓也有一定的抗辐射
作用。
还可以吃什么？
黑芝麻：黑芝麻益肾，多吃补肾食品可增强身体细胞免疫、体液免疫功能，有效保护人体健康。
紫苋菜：紫苋菜有抗辐射、抗突变、抗氧化的作用，与其含硒有关。硒是一种重要的微量元素，能提高人体对抗辐射的能力。
绿 茶：绿茶中的茶多酚，不仅有抗癌和清除体内的自由基的效果，还可以抗辐射。每天喝绿茶对身体非常有益。茶叶中海含有脂多糖，能改善造血功能，升高血小板和白细胞等。
番茄红素：番茄红素不仅具备卓越的抗辐射能力，且抗氧化能力极强。番茄红素广泛存在于番茄、杏、番石榴、西瓜、番木瓜、红葡萄等水果及蔬菜中。其中，番茄中的含量相对较高，多存在于番茄的皮和籽中。此外，番茄红素是脂溶性维生素，必须用油超过才能被人体吸收。
藻类食品：藻含有丰富的植物蛋白，多种氨基酸、微量元素、维生素、矿物质和生物活性物质，可促进骨髓细胞的造血功能，增强骨髓细胞的增值能力，促进血清蛋白的生物合成，从而提高人体的免疫力。因此，多吃海带、螺旋藻之类等视频，具有明显的抗辐射作用。
问：遭遇核辐射应该怎么办？
答：遭遇核辐射“内外兼防”：隐蔽式主要防护措施。
中国疾控中心表示，暴漏于电离辐射可能会增加患癌症的风险。核事故后烟云能漂浮多远很难预测，它取决于风速和其他天象条件。在突发事件的早期和中期，隐蔽式主要的防护措施之一，大多数建筑物可使建筑物内的人员吸入剂量约降低一半，隐蔽时间一般认为不应超过2天。
一、体外照射的防护原则：1、尽可能缩短被照射时间；2、尽可能远离放射源；3、注意屏蔽，利用铅板、钢板或墙壁挡住或降低照射强度。
二、体内照射的防护原则：避免食入、减少吸收、增加排泄、避免在污染地区逗留。
1、进入空气被放射性物质污染严重的地区时，要对五官严防死守。例如，用手帕、毛巾、布料等捂住口鼻，减少放射性物质的吸入。
2、穿戴麦子、头巾、眼镜、雨衣、手套和靴子等，有助于减少体表放
射性污染。
3、要特别注意，不要使用受到污染的水、食品等。
4、如果事故严重，需要居民撤离污染区，应听从有关部门的命令，有组织、有秩序地撤离到安全地点。将受到污染的衣服、鞋、帽等脱下存放，进行监测和处理。
5、受到或可疑受到放射性污染的人员应清除污染，最好的方法是洗淋浴。
问：碘盐能防辐射吗？
答：据报道，所泄漏的放射性物质主要是从压力容器内释放出的易挥发的碘-131和铯-137.但碘盐在防核辐射这个问题上起不到任何作用。碘盐中的碘含量相对较低，起不到预防放射性碘的作用。碘-131仅是放射性物质中的一种，这种物质对于甲状腺会有损伤，吃稳定性的碘一般只能保护青少年的甲状腺不受这种物质的辐射，对其他人群没有过多的益处，但碘盐中碘的含量不足以防辐射。
服用碘片防辐射的机理：如果身体已经有了足够的碘，就不会再从大气中吸收更多的碘。碘片让身体吸收满非放射性碘元素，就能避免对放射性碘同位素的吸收。但是，碘片的服用需要在相关人员的指导下进行，随意服用可能导致碘超标，造成甲状腺肿大等疾病。而含碘量较低的药物，对防辐射并无作用。涂碘酒防辐射的做法是无稽之谈，碘必须内服才能在甲状腺肿富集，否则毫无作用。而碘酒作为外用药，不能内服。
问：核电站安全吗？
答：核能发电是目前核能和平利用的最主要的方式。在职哼唱运行情况下，核电站对周围公众产生的辐射剂量对人们并不构成任何危险。在我国，国家核安全法规要求核电站在癌正常运行工况下对周围居民产生的年辐射剂量不得超过0.25毫西弗，而核电站实际产生的辐射剂量远远低于这个限值。大量的研究和调查数据表明，核电站对公众健康的影响远远小于人们日常生活中所经常遇到的一些健康风险，例如吸烟和空气污染等。因此，核电站在正常运行情况下的环境安全性已被人们所广泛接受。
据国家原子能机构网站介绍，核电安全的核心在于防止反应堆中的放
射性裂变产物泄漏到周围的环境中。为了防止反应堆堆芯中的放射性裂变产物的外泄，在工程商设臵有适当的实体屏障。核电站一般都有3道安全屏障，他们是燃料各元件包壳、一回路压力边界和安全壳。如：日本福岛核电站事故发生前，世界范围内曾发生过两起重大核事故，即三里岛核电站事故和切尔诺贝利核电站事故。1979年3月28日，美国三里岛核电站发生了严重事故，反应堆堆芯的一部分融化坍塌。但由于一回路压力边界和安全壳的包容作用，泄漏到周围环境中的放射性核素微乎其微，没有对环境和公众的健康产生危害。
篇二：班级手抄报
四班报刊
我是乔,地球尔等种族,从有意识开始,就被千万次地灌输着同一个定律：人类永远正确！
我曾在?人类机器人灵魂培养高等学校?接受教育，并最终被一名老科学家买走。我跟着他来到一座孤寂的海岛，那里只有主人的家和实验室。时光飞转，我原以为日子会一直这样下去。但意外在一个下午从天而降，一名少女被海浪冲上了沙滩，我把她捡回了家。从此岛上又多了一名可爱的少女。
据说防不胜防的感情会令人类荡气回肠，可惜我还没有学会复杂的荡气回肠，但突如其来的少女却教会了我另一种相对简单的人类情绪—快乐。
一天， 少女告诉我，她是属人，是天皇级巨星玛丽莲的属人。 属人，及社会为奖励诸如政界要人、国际巨星、豪富名流等人类精英而专门为其衍生的克隆人。玛丽莲拥有两个属人。三年前，她急需做心脏移植手术，于是属人一号作为最匹配的供体，被立即人道毁灭，而属人一号的心脏便从此跳跃在了玛丽莲的胸膛里。那么，眼前的少女……?你是玛丽莲的属人二号。?
少女颔首：?不错。我趁人不注意跳入大海，后来就飘到了这里。但人类处置属人的法规是严厉里，收留逃跑属人的人，会被判重刑；收留逃跑属人的机器人，会被销毁。我实在不能再隐瞒真相，欺骗你……?
我仿佛看见一只蝴蝶在狂风骤雨中苦苦挣扎，绝望而凄美。送她回去？让她被人道毁灭或形存神往？留下她？违反永远正确的人类所制定的规则？我只觉得脑子里一片混沌……过了好一会儿，我终于顿悟了：真正的灵魂应该在混沌中孕育，在矛盾中爆发，在打破后诞生。想到这里，我说：?你别叫属人2号了，叫小狸吧？?
?乔，小狸都告诉我了，你打算怎么办？?主人看着我。?我决定陪她亡命天涯。?
?但是，你们离开海岛一定会被发现。??主人，你曾说过，亡命，不过是让灵魂回归天国，把躯体还给大地，我不觉得可惜。小狸，你说呢？??不自由，毋宁死。?少女和我同仇敌忾。
主人大笑起来，正在这时一阵铃声打断了主人的笑语，我立即把小狸带到岛上最隐蔽的角落藏匿，在返回屋内时，主人拿着一张纸?军方应召令?陷入深深的
2016年8月29日 星期一
总编辑:胡勇鹏、刘康宁 副编辑:刘琪、杜少杰、郝文龙、李佳明
1504班 第一期
沉思。
良久，主人道出了一段尘封的往事。他曾是?基因变异研究组?的科学家，50年前?犀湖那?海底核电站发生过一次核泄漏，她们奉命去调查，结果，发现了一种因核辐射导致变种的?乌贼?。这种乌贼能够完美模拟别的生物形态，以躲避天敌的袭击。经研究，这是由其体内的一种沉睡基因所控制。接着，科学家们又发现人和大多数动物体内也存在这种基因。于是，她们决定进行一次人体?变态?实验。结果那次实验的志愿者没有恢复人形，最后一杉树的形态成为一种新型的可以进行光合作用的植物人。这个实验引起轩然大波，后来，小组被迫解体，他就来到了这里。主人接着说：?现在军方打算召集所有小组成员去继续该项目的研究。乔，这一去我们也许将永远失去自由。?
?主人，如果我们必须去，小狸怎么办？??让我也变成一棵树吧！其实您从来没有放弃过是不是？?小狸拉着主人的手。
五天后，我和主人在军方人员的?陪同?下离岛而去。岛上的那片树林，在视线里渐渐模糊，却在脑海中越来越清晰，那里面有一棵树，名字叫?小狸?那棵树在没成为树前，曾吻过我的脸：?乔，从地上向着太阳生长，树也是某种幸福的表象，为了接受这种幸福，我愿意像树一样安宁，就在岛上等待你们，回来把我唤醒。?那一刻，我终于明白了，什么叫荡气回肠……
? ? ? ?
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? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
换心手术失败，医生问快要断气的病人有什么遗言要交代，你猜他会说什么？点击显示答案 “Kiss”是动词,形容词还是名词? 点击显示答案 什么东西越热越爱出来？点击显示答案 什么越洗越脏，不洗有人吃，洗了没人吃？点击显示答案
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由于什么原因死亡的人最多？点击显示答案 有一个眼睛瞎了的人，走到山崖边上，为什么突然停住了然后往回走？点击显示答案 为什么先看见闪电后听到雷声？点击显示答案 一本书放在地上什么地方你跨不过去？点击显示答案
如果诸葛亮活着，世界现在会有什么不同？点击显示答案
三个人，竖着站成一排。有五个帽子，三个蓝色，两个红色，每人带一个，各自不准看自己的颜色。然后问第一个人带的什么颜色的帽子，他说不知道，然后又问第二个人带的什么颜色的帽子，同样说不知道，又问第三个人带的是什么颜色的帽子，他说我知道。问第三个人带的是什么色帽子? （第一个人站在排的最后,他可以看见前二个人的帽子的颜色)点击显示答案
? 为什么流氓坐车不要钱？点击显示答案
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
楚楚的生日在三月三十日，请问是哪年的三月三十日？点击显示答案
一头公牛加一头母牛，猜三个字？点击显示答案
一个离过五十次婚的女人，应该怎么形容她？(一个成语)点击显示答案
在什么时候1+2不等于3？点击显示答案 什么样的轮子只转不走？点击显示答案 为什么女人穿高跟鞋后，就代表她快结婚了？点击显示答案
黑人和白人生下的婴儿，牙齿是什么颜色？点击显示答案
报纸上登的消息不一定百分之百是真的，但什么消息绝对假不了？点击显示答案
家有家规，国有国规，那动物园里有啥规？点击显示答案
答案:
1. 每年的三月三十日 2. 两头牛 3. 前功尽弃 4. 算错的时候 5. 风车的轮子
6. 穿高跟鞋走得快,很容易被追上
7. 婴儿没有牙齿 8. 时间 9. 乌龟
10. 好色之徒 11. 坏的时候
12. 那就是同年同月同日结婚 其他见下期
你若想尝试一下勇者的滋味，一定要像个真正的勇者一样，豁出全部的力量去行动，这时你的恐惧心理将会为勇猛果敢所取代。 --------丘吉尔
谁是不可战胜的人？那种在任何时候都临危不惧的人。 ------爱比克泰德
一个有坚强心志的人，财产可以被人掠夺，勇气却不能被人剥夺。
-------雨 果
有胆气的人是不惊慌的人，有勇气的人是考虑到危险而不退缩的人；在危险中仍然保持他的勇气的人是勇敢的，轻率的人则是莽撞的，他敢于去冒险是因为他不知道危险。 --------康 德
在下决心以前，犹豫也许是必要的。然而，一旦下了决心，就应该一直往前走。
-------石川达三
勇敢是处于逆境时的光芒。 -------茨威格
人心忧惧则前途之光明，幸福顷刻间为黑幕所遮。 -------远 嘱
对付贫穷要有勇气，忍受嘲笑要有勇气，正视自己营垒里的敌对者也要有勇气。
勇气通往天堂，怯懦通往地狱。 ------塞内加
我认为克服恐惧最好的办法理应是：面对内心所恐惧的事情，勇往直前地去做，直到成功为止。 ------罗斯福
勇气是人类最重要的一种特质，倘若有了勇气，人类其他的特质自然也就具备了。 -----丘吉尔
勇敢是与深思和决断为伍的。 ------俞吾金
勇敢里面有天才、力量和魔法。 --------歌 德
患难可以试验一个人的品格；非常的境遇才可以显出非常的气节；，风平浪静的海面，所有的船只都可以并驱竞争；命运的铁拳击中要害的时候，只有大勇大智的人才能够处之泰然。 -------莎士比亚
天下绝无不热烈勇敢地追求成功，而能取得成功的人。 ------拿破仑
此外，这些胆怯的人不会明白，冰一裂脚下就要崩塌-----这就证明：人在走路，只有一种方法才不会坍塌-----这就是不停地一直往前走。 ------托尔斯泰
勇敢征服一切：它甚至能给血肉之躯增添力量。 --------奥维德
认为痛苦是最大的不幸，是不可能勇敢的；认为享受是最大的幸福的人，是不可能有节制的。 -------西塞罗
如果一个人的激情，无论在快乐还是苦恼中，都有保持不忘理智所教给的关于什么应当恐惧，什么不应当惧怕的信条，那么我们就因他的激情部分而称每个这样的人为勇敢的人。 ------柏拉图
英雄就是对任何事都有全力以赴，自始至终，心无旁骛的人。 -------波德莱尔
要坚强，要勇敢，不要让绝望和庸俗的忧愁压倒你，要保持伟大的灵魂在经受苦难时的豁达与平静。 ------亚米契斯
畏惧敌人徒然沮丧了自己的勇气，也就是削弱自己的力量，增加敌人的声势，等于让自己的愚蠢攻击自己。畏惧并不能免于一死，战争的结果大不了也不过一死。奋战而死，是以死亡摧毁死亡，畏怯而死，却做了死亡的奴隶。
------莎士比亚
只要你坚持的时间足够长，在恐惧之中的某一时刻来到之后，恐惧就根本不再是极端的痛苦，而不过是一种十分讨厌、令人恼火的刺激。 ------福克纳
痛苦有个限度，恐惧则绵绵无际。 -------浦利尼斯二世
有德必有勇，正直的人绝不胆怯。 -------莎士比亚
如果你是懦夫，你就是你自己最大的敌人；但如果你是勇者，你就是你自己最大的朋友。 -------弗兰克
大胆产生勇气，多疑却产生恐惧。 --------康拉德
你在患难之日若胆怯，你的力量就微小。 -------《箴言》
勇敢是一种基于自尊的意识而发展成的能力。 ------拿破仑
表现勇敢则勇气来；往后退缩则恐惧来。 --------康拉德
侮辱那些无法要你道歉的人，本身就是怯懦的表现。 --------米克沙特·卡尔曼
注:送你们个简单的,姐姐下次给个难一点的.
好
大学最在乎学生领导力的培养大学是人生在少年向青年转变过程中需要群居生活在一起的一个特殊地方。在李言荣校长看来，好大学最重要的不是学生就业率的高低和日后收入的不同，而是培养了学生一种做事的标准。?这个标准会悄悄地、一点一点地渗进同学们的血液中，并升华为一种做人的标准，从而影响着同学们的一生，甚至会影响到同学们家庭的几代人。?李言荣说，好大学的学生有一种特质，他们?越能干、越努力，越上进、越幸运，越成功、越珍惜?。那么，好大学应该注重学生什么能力的培养呢？李言荣认为，好大学最在乎的是学生领导能力的培养。?领导力就是比常人有更强的洞见力和运用语言的能力，能聆听到不同的声音、能多视角地看待事物、能应变随机出现的变化，领导力强的人都有一个共同点------那就是都有语言天赋,或经后天开发训练出来的语言能力能用富有感染力的语言说服周围的人跟你一起干,甚至更多是动员犹豫不绝的人跟随你一起干。?大学期间训练自己?听说读写?能力 让思辨与表达能力天天向上 好大学的学生绝不是人云亦云。李言荣校长说，?人一生从中小学到大学的所有学习过程主要是培养两种能力：演绎与归纳的思维能力和阅读与写作的交流能力，其本质就是‘思辨与表达’能力。人与人的差异，或大学主要不是来自知识点和知识量方面的，而是来自思辨与表达能力的巨大差异，这种能力本身并不是天生的，都是后天可以培养的。”为此，他将外语学习中的“听说读写”引申到了大学学习当中。学生在大学里要有意识地训练“听、说、读、写”能力，这“新四会”是人们在事业工作、日常生活中获取信息、认识世界、智能智慧、情感交流的一种重要手段。
I hope to have a people who know me, even if I say nothing.
篇三：有关核电演讲
Rosatom’s 3rd International Forum ATOMEXPO 2011 Moscow 6-8 June 2011
John Ritch, Director General, World Nuclear Association
Director General Kirienko, ladies and gentlemen:
I offer cordial thanks to Rosatom for the opportunity to participate in this valuable forum. The various nuclear
enterprises that constitute Rosatom are prominent members of the World Nuclear Association, and we are proud to work with you – and for you – in building a future in which Russia plays a leading and expanding role in the global nuclear industry.
Over the past decade, many nations around the world reviewed their energy and environment policies and came inexorably to the same conclusion. For reasons of energy independence and environmental responsibility, they
determined that nuclear power must play a central role in their national energy strategies for the 21st Century.
Recent events at Fukushima now compel us to assess three questions:
? What have we learned from Fukushima?
? How should the custodians of nuclear power – in both government and industry – respond?
?
Has Fukushima fundamentally altered the prospect of an expanded worldwide use of nuclear power?
What We Have Learned Thus Far: Known Truths Underscored
A starting point is to define Fukushima. Although the terms “nuclear disaster” and “nuclear tragedy” are commonly applied, there is reason to resist such usage. When 24,000 Japanese citizens have been killed by an enormous earthquake and a resulting tsunami which combined into one of the great calamities in that nation’s history, does it not seem a gross abuse of language to label as a disaster an occurrence incidental to that calamity which has not in itself produced a single fatality?
It is certainly true that some 100,000 people are likely to be delayed for a year in returning to the evacuation zone near the plant to begin rebuilding from the rubble of earthquake-tsunami
destruction. But their exclusion for that period is, in large measure, a precautionary policy, explicitly designed to ensure against any possibility of radiation jeopardy to this populace. Even this severe inconvenience would be wrongly labeled as a disaster.
Certainly Fukushima was an “accident” – as that word applies to unplanned, unexpected events with undesirable results. But “accident” suggests operational error, as occurred at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. At Fukushima, we have witnessed instead the results of a fundamental error in design – arising from a failure of Japanese scientists, regulators and operators to properly imagine worst-case threats and to protect the reactors’ back-up cooling capabilities against such threats. An alternative is to choose the word “mistake”, while recognizing that the word “disaster” certainly applies to the event’s economic impact on Tepco and to its wide public impact on perceptions of nuclear power.
Whether we choose to call it an accident, a mistake, or a disaster, Fukushima has been educational primarily in reinforcing several truths we knew already about nuclear power and about the public and policy context that surround its use. Because of Fukushima, these truths are even clearer now:
1) Inevitability of Nuclear Events. First, nuclear accidents happen. This is not a trivial observation. In our rigorous efforts to build safety into nuclear power, we have properly embraced the mantra that a nuclear accident should never happen again. But we should never have confidence that we can succeed absolutely in this quest, and we should never expect the public to believe that we have. We must expect, and must concede, that human beings made mistakes, individually and collectively; and our aim must be to ensure, and explain persuasively, that even worst-case nuclear events are both exceedingly low in probability and increasingly small in consequence as nuclear technology continues to advance. Right now, most people, even non-nuclear scientists, assume that nuclear power carries the low probability of a highly harmful event. For those who believe in nuclear energy, the journey will be steeply uphill so long as that belief remains widespread. To repeat, we must establish technically, and explain convincingly, that nuclear events are both increasingly low in probability and increasingly low in consequence. That will be true and must be presented believably.
2) The Universal Necessity of Reliable Backup Cooling. Second, every nuclear reactor requires reliable post-shutdown cooling. Like a race-horse after the race, a nuclear reactor
after shut-down needs a cooling down period to remove residual heat. Some advanced reactor designs will soon accomplish this internally, using natural physical principles. But for current reactors, post shut-down heat removal depends on a supply of external power.
It bears emphasis that the entire Japanese reactor fleet has repeatedly passed the test of shutting down successfully in response to past earthquakes, and did so again in March during the largest earthquake in Japanese history. Shut-down instantly lowers the reactor’s core power to only 6-7% of operational power, and it then takes just a few days of cooling for core power to drop below 1%. But for a reactor supplying electricity to, say, 700,000 people, even 1% is still the thermal power needed to generate electricity for seven thousand people – in other words, a great deal of heat must be dissipated.
This means that post-shutdown cooling is a critical non-nuclear aspect of nuclear technology, and Fukushima has imprinted on us indelibly how essential this function is to the safety and future of nuclear power. Our commitment to ensuring the reliability of post-shutdown cooling – in every reactor everywhere – must be absolute.
3) The Essential Safety of Nuclear Power. Third, despite widespread impressions to the contrary, Fukushima underscores the essential safety of nuclear power. At Fukushima, three operating reactors and one recently shut-down, ranging in age from 33 to 40 years, were assaulted first by the worst earthquake in Japan’s history. Its effect was devastating on the Fukushima locale, wiping out towns, power supplies, and hundreds of lives from among the friends, colleagues and families of those working at the power plant. One hour later, amidst this physical chaos and human tragedy, a gigantic tsunami flooded the plant’s backup diesel
generators, which through mistaken planning were ill-equipped to survive it.
This left the four reactors and their spent fuel ponds dangerously uncooled for a sustained period. The result was radioactive releases from a combination of necessary pressure venting, fuel melt and breaches in full containment. The heroic efforts of Fukushima’s plant workers have earned the admiration of all us in the nuclear profession, but could not prevent leakages into nearby sea and land areas in excess of standard safety limits. This was truly a worst-case nuclear event.
Yet, so limited have been the releases, and so precautionary are Japan’s safety standards and evacuation policies, that it is still reasonable to expect that not a single radiation fatality will result from Fukushima. This is not a statement of complacency or indifference, but of simple fact. Meanwhile, we can estimate that in the days since Fukushima several thousands of people have died worldwide in the mining of fossil fuels and from the health consequences of fossil combustion. In any rational analysis, the “disaster” at Fukushima ought to be viewed in this context.
4) Media Frenzy is Today’s Norm. A fourth truth from Fukushima is that present-day media coverage is more inclined to frenzy than to balance in any event involving nuclear energy. In a world of competitive, round-the-clock, televised news, there is clearly a compulsion to cover any nuclear story as the industrial equivalent of a sex scandal. In today’s context, the terms “melt-down” and “radiation leak” are too titillating to resist, and we must expect this tendency to persist so long as we have failed to demythologize nuclear energy. Achieving that would mean creating much wider public understanding of radiation as a ubiquitous natural
phenomenon and of the limited consequences of radioactive release likely to result even from worst-case events associated with nuclear power.
5) Weak Support Where Nuclear is an Ideological Issue. A fifth reality underscored by Fukushima is the bizarre weakness of support for nuclear power in a few technologically advanced European countries. The Swiss cabinet has initiated a nuclear phase-out. In Italy the Berlusconi government has shelved plans to reintroduce nuclear energy in the only country ever to abandon it. And the German coalition has now begun a nuclear shut-down that will render Germany less energy independent, more reliant on foreign gas and domestic coal, and with the economic burden of squandering hundreds of billions of Euros in valuable nuclear assets while greatly expanding its subsidy budget for renewables.
For an advanced industrial nation boasting Europe’s largest economy, this knee-jerk and potentially historic change in energy policy is a truly astonishing response to the flooding of several diesel generators half a world away on the east coast of Japan, and its heavy cost will be shared by German stockholders, taxpayers and consumers. Any national energy strategy should be geared to affordability, to reliability and to true – as opposed to illusory – environmental protection. Against those criteria, it is difficult to credit German claims that its new policy represents a bold step into the future.
6) Solidity of Support in Many Key Nations. A sixth truth, also shown in foreign reaction to Fukushima, is the solidity of public policy in support for nuclear power in most countries now using it. This is especially true in those countries planning major programs of nuclear new-build, led by China, India, Russia, Britain, South Africa, and South Korea. In other major nations too, including Brazil, France, Poland, and the USA, we see little evidence of lost momentum. Even in Japan, the new post-Fukushima policy affirms a renewed commitment to nuclear power along with a new emphasis on renewables and efficiency.
7) Thinness of Public Understanding. A seventh and countervailing reality is that public understanding of nuclear power in many countries remains thin and readily susceptible to misimpression. Where we see constancy in policy support for nuclear power, it relies mainly on consensus among policymakers and on nuclear power not becoming, in the country’s politics, an ideological litmus-test as it has in Germany. Nonetheless, Fukushima has undoubtedly produced a decline in public confidence in nuclear power in countries around the world, amidst a widespread impression that Japan’s natural catastrophe was seriously compounded by a manmade disaster. Once again we have learned that “radiation” ranks high as one of the most potent and evocative words in any language.
8) Continuing Power of the Chernobyl Myth. A closely related truth, vividly underscored by media coverage of Fukushima, is that the myth of Chernobyl retains a powerful hold on public consciousness and remains a main journalistic reference point with respect to the perceived dangers of nuclear power. I refer to the “myth” of Chernobyl because so few people understand that the Chernobyl reactor that exploded and caught fire in 1986 bears little relevance to any reactor now operating and because the real, scientifically analyzed consequences of Chernobyl differ so drastically from the public impression.
A genuine authority on Chernobyl consequences is Dr. Geraldine Thomas, a molecular pathologist who heads the Chernobyl Tissue Bank at Imperial College, London. Dr. Thomas reflects a broad scientific consensus in stating that the findings of radiation fatalities from Chernobyl are strictly limited – to several dozen persons severely irradiated while fighting the reactor fire (the so-called “liquidators”) and to a small number of public persons in the Chernobyl vicinity, statistically thought to be 16 in number, who should be assumed to have died from thyroid cancer caused by radioactive iodine emitted
by the burning reactor.
As Dr. Thomas and many other Chernobyl authorities will attest, the allegation of any other radiation fatalities must depend on so-called “collective dose” theory, which is neither scientifically based nor logically persuasive. Its logic is not unlike concluding that because ingesting 1000 aspirins is always fatal, then one out of every thousand people taking a single aspirin can be expected to die.
But little of this is commonly understood, and when authorities raised Fukushima to level 7 as a “Serious Accident” on the International Nuclear Event Scale – a number theretofore assigned only to Chernobyl – millions around the world promptly concluded that they were witnessing a human catastrophe of immense proportions.
9) Nuclear Economics Remain Paramount. A final truth, underscored as we contemplate the potential worldwide policy and regulatory response to Fukushima, is that the economics of nuclear power remain crucial to its future. We all know that, compared to other major power technologies, nuclear is expensive to build and cheap to operate. It therefore requires an investment decision based on confidence in long-term amortization. In the past decade, even amidst growing confidence in the nuclear power’s worldwide future, we have seen the industry struggle in trying to limit capital costs while venturing to build new-generation reactors of even safer design. In countries where investment decisions are made by the private sector, it has become increasingly clear that at least some government involvement, in the form of assurances and guarantees, may be essential if the full clean-energy benefits of nuclear power are to be gained in a time frame dictated by increasingly urgent environmental need.
The already high entry-level costs of nuclear power render it crucially important that any regulatory actions in response to Fukushima be strictly gauged against the criterion of cost-effective safety gain.
Response by Government and Industry: Using the Institutional Tools at Hand
In a climate that is rife with the impulse to “do something” about Fukushima, it important to identify sound principles against which to judge any proposed response. These simple fundamentals offer a start:
1) Sound Institutional Framework for Response. First, we should recognize that we stand well-equipped institutionally
with the means to examine the event at Fukushima and to draw and apply lessons from it. At the national level, nuclear regulators are already at work, and at the international level we have two immensely valuable mechanisms to guide the overall global response: the IAEA inter-governmentally and WANO as a private sector safety agency networking every power reactor worldwide. Cooperation within and among these institutional assets is now the task at hand.
WNA will do all possible to support both of these lead actors. With a membership that includes not only utilities but also nuclear reactor vendors, uranium miners and eichers, fuel makers, and EPC companies, we are the one international organization spanning the entire global nuclear industry. In that capacity, we stand ready to coordinate participation by experts from these companies in any Fukushima-response activities initiated by the Agency and by WANO.
2) Focus Solely on Cost-Effective Measures. Second, Fukushima-response should focus solely on substantive measures promising real and cost-effective safety gain. A variety of topics, arising directly from the Fukushima event and relevant to every nuclear power plant, bear careful analysis using available institutions. These topics include measures to regain AC power in the event of blackout, to waterproof and otherwise protect diesel generators, and to ensure adequate battery coping times. Fukushima also requires a new focus on how best to optimize safety and efficiency in spent fuel management.
A proposal deserving deliberation – by the Agency and by WANO, perhaps in cooperation – comes from James Ellis, head of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations in Atlanta, who envisages an international emergency response unit, geared to rapid, expert-led action using pre-staged
interoperable equipment. The very exploration of this concept could serve as a valuable stimulus to need-analysis and to preparations at the national level for emergency response.
As to Fukushima’s implications for reactor technology, new insights may emerge as the event is studied over time. That process will by its nature engage the world’s foremost experts in considering implications for reactor design. Reactor design has, of course, advanced considerably since the Daiichi plant was built, but it is well possible that the dynamics of what occurred in the hydrogen explosion, fuel melt and loss of full containment will inform the designers’ understanding.
3) Avoid Symbolic Gestures. Third, Fukushima-response
should avoid symbolic steps offering little real gain. A case in point is the initiative whereby the UN Secretary General will convene various UN agencies this September in Manhattan to engage on the subject of preventing another Fukushima. As the IAEA is the UN’s well-established means to bring genuine expertise to bear on such objectives, it is difficult to see how this vaguely conceived conference can be more than an invitation to public posturing and political mischief.
Questions of symbolism-versus-substance also surround the coming “stress tests” instigated by the EU Commission at all European reactors. But here there is a clear positive side. This initiative has served to broaden safety consciousness to include greater emphasis on natural disasters, and it also represents a potentially constructive step in the direction of harmonizing international standards for power plant design. If the Commission’s initiative serves to stimulate genuinely cost-effective safety measures, it will have met the standard of substance over symbolism.
4) Review and Restart on Public Perception. Finally, we should carefully re-think the whole question of public perception of nuclear energy. In the 25 years since Chernobyl, industry and government have operated on the paradigm that by implementing ever tighter standards on nuclear safety while attaining an ever longer record of safe nuclear performance, we would build public confidence in nuclear power. This was not misguided, and was to a considerable degree successful. But it was incomplete. What Fukushima revealed so harshly is that both the media and the public have gotten only part of the message. The nuclear industry is still, in essence, regarded as safely managing Doomsday machines. In that concept, the word “Doomsday” will always trump the assertion of safe management.
We must act to change this widespread conception. If electricity is a vital public service and not simply a market commodity, and if the issue of how we generate electricity now bears urgently on the future of our Earthly environment, then a policy of laissez-faire will not suffice. We need to focus rigorously, in a cooperative effort involving government and industry, on just how we can enhance public understanding of this valuable asset. If nuclear power must play a central role in any strategy to avert radical climate change, then there exists a compelling public interest in building widespread awareness of the virtues of that technology.
We have facts in our favor. The question is how best to use facts to alleviate fears, instill confidence and enhance
awareness of nuclear power’s environmental value. We should regard the effort to build this understanding as nothing less than an imperative of public policy.
In this quest, WNA has value to offer and would willingly partner with others. Our Public Information Service, available on the WNA website, is the world’s most heavily used resource on nuclear energy. It offers an encyclopedic range of up-to-date papers, including a portfolio of short papers specifically designed for schools. These offerings are hit at the encouraging rate of once every 5 seconds. Their limitation, however, is that they are delivered passively, reaching only those in search of knowledge and only in English. To overcome broad deficiencies in public awareness, what is needed is a focused approach designed on a country by country basis.
Such projects would require resources, but could prove supremely cost-effective. Certainly we know already that, in many countries, such information is sorely lacking or grossly distorted. Imagine, as a thought experiment, the difference in the relevant textbook information now reaching ordinary students in South Korea as against those in Europe and North America. Who here has any doubt that the Korean student will know more of what is true? By no coincidence, South Korea is quickly emerging as a world leader in nuclear power.
An Unchanged Reality: The Urgent Worldwide Need for Nuclear Power
As we shape a response to Fukushima, a basic truth is that this event – even if we call it a disaster – has done nothing to alter the realities that have led so many different nations in recent years to a common nuclear path. These realities are stark:
? World population will continue its explosive growth – from 3 billion in 1960 to almost 7 billion today, and from here upward toward 9 billion by the middle of this century.
? World energy demand will, in the lifetimes of our children, increase by a factor of three. ?
Our world’s most capable climate scientists will continue to warn, with ever greater urgency, that we must, even as global energy consumption triples, cut worldwide carbon emissions by 80% – or risk changes in Earth’s climate so radical as to threaten much of civilization.
? And, even after Fukushima, it will remain true that the world’s nations can achieve this global clean-energy revolution only with a vastly expanded use of nuclear power.
Because Fukushima cannot change these momentous realities, our duty is to act so that nuclear power can play its central and necessary global role. In this quest, our tools – a combination of ever safer practice and ever better public education – are clearly known and immensely important.
In confirming our commitment to this task, we at WNA look forward to collaboration with the enterprises of Rosatom. Thank you.
Opening Remarks
World Nuclear Fuel Conference 2011 Chicago / 6 April
John Ritch, WNA Director General
Ladies and gentlemen, I offer you a warm welcome to this seventh World Nuclear Fuel Cycle conference. NEI and WNA began co-hosting these meetings starting with Madrid back in 2004, and from there we have continued an annual rotation – from Europe to America to Asia, and back again. Chicago marks our third WNFC in America.
This would be our eighth conference rather than our seventh, but we missed last year when an Icelandic volcano, dormant for 200 years and expected to remain so, suddenly erupted with an outpouring that blocked international air travel for a week. Our Munich meeting, scheduled to occur in 2010, will now be held in a future year instead.
That unexpected disruption a year ago offered a gentle reminder of Nature’s power – and carried just the modest price tag of widespread inconvenience. This year Nature again demonstrated her capacity for violence and exacted a toll far more severe.
From the earthquake and tsunami that devastated Japan on March 11th, it now appears that the death count may reach 25,000 Japanese citizens while the economic loss may total 250 billion dollars. This is a natural disaster of historic magnitude, and our sympathy extends to the entire Japanese nation. Our compassion flows particularly to our Japanese colleagues, some of whom have laboured on to fulfil their
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